【禁闻】上将授衔等一等 位子争夺战未息

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【新唐人2012年7月31日讯】按照惯例,在“八一”前都有一批解放军高层被授予上将军衔,但是今年迟迟没有动静,直到“八一”前夕,才见媒体发布中央军委晋升6名上将的消息。而另一方面,“北戴河会议”也迟迟没有举行。评论表示,这显示中共高层在党、政、军高层人事安排上还在激斗。

很快就到八月,解放军各大总部、军区、军种的中将、少将授衔仪式已经陆续举行,中央军委的上将授衔日期曾出现23日、28日等版本,但都没有落实。 另外,被视为中共现任高层、退休元老权力角逐场的“北戴河会议”,也没有像海外热传的在25号举行。中共政治局九位常委27号还在北京一起露面,显示“北戴河会议”已押后。

香港《苹果日报》30号评论说,这显示中共高层在党、政、军高层人事安排上还在激斗。

时事评论员横河指出,从7•21北京水灾后,中共9名常委整整在传媒头条位置上消失了16天,从这可以看出,目前中共高层对下一代人选的斗争激烈到了什么程度。

时事评论员横河:“今年确实是已经到了7月底了,按照常规,这个不是什么规定,就是按照传统来说,应该是授一次军衔的。但是,现在显然北戴河会议中共所面临的问题,特别是现在最高领导人所面临的问题,大概比军队授衔可能要更重要。下一班接班人的问题没有解决的情况下,可能顾不上授衔的事情。”

《中国事务》杂志主编伍凡指出,军中“挺薄、倒薄派之争”还没有结束,胡锦涛苦于在军中影响力不够,因此现在有比授衔上将更主要的问题。

《中国事务》主编伍凡:“授军衔哪,恐怕目前还不是最主要问题。最主要现在,下个新的军委,谁进去。如果军委安排不好,那么旧的军委走不了,新的军委进不来,那对胡锦涛是非常非常不利的。而胡锦涛又想当下一届的军委主席,头两年,所以他无论如何要把军委委员,副主席得拉住,这是最至关重要的。”

虽然在薄熙来倒台之后,军方多次向“胡中央”表示忠心,但伍凡认为,这里面可能隐含着交易。

伍凡:“尽管前一个时期郭伯雄带头,把所有的军委副主席军委委员带领表示效忠,但是我看这都不是真实的,这都是表面的。他们跟胡锦涛恐怕要达成什么协议,我来表忠,你下一届的军委主席当两年,但是军委委员,他们这些头头们要有发言权。所以这里面我估计还没有摆平。”

中共目前仍然没有公布薄熙来罪名。而最近,受到薄案牵连的重庆市警备区司令员朱和平在消失3个月后,也首度公开露面。香港《明报》引述分析人士的话说,这显示中共尽力缩小薄案影响面,特别不想影响军队稳定。

横河认为,中共希望降低薄熙来案子的影响,因此对重新表忠的官员不加深究。

横河:“在中共最高当局来说的话,对于薄熙来这个案子,他们希望是能够进行‘损伤控制’,就是不要让它影响面太大,也不想在这件事情上把军队整个就动乱掉,因为他们其实也没有这个能力把军队给动乱掉,他必须要依靠军队内部的力量,才可能去清算。”

伍凡指出,这再次显示出,军方和党不是一条心。

伍凡:“薄熙来下台了,而这个警队司令一根汗毛都没有动啊,上头的人保护了他。他们就是较量这个,我让你同意做两年军委主席,但是军队的事情你不要插手了,我们来安排好了。所以军队现在还摆不平啊,表面上我忠心给你,可是那是空的,那我们交易可以啊,真的跟你走,恐怕非常难哪。”

朱和平曾被报导涉嫌用薄熙来提供的公款,给退休将领建造“首长楼”而受到调查并被停职。另外,包括总后勤部政委刘源上将、二炮政委张海阳上将、驻云南14集团军军长周小周少将等,多名军方将领被指出受到牵连,但这些人后来都相继公开露面,周小周最近更晋升为成都军区参谋长。

采访/常春 编辑/尚燕 后制/王明宇

CCP Infighting Delays Promotion of Generals

Unlike previous years, no information has been released
about promotions until today, when news broke that
six have been promoted as generals.
However, the Beidaihe meeting hasn’t been held yet.
This year it has been quiet so far,
although the Beidaihe meeting was adjourned.
One commentator says this indicates in-fighting among
high-level CCP leaders, over the senior military positions.

Soon it will be August; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s
People’s Liberation Army major headquarters and military
regions and services have held many ceremonies, awarding
officials the ranks of lieutenant generals and major generals.
There was news of ceremonies being held on July 23 and 28,
however, it was not implemented.
In addition, rumors said there would be a power struggle
among currently retired senior veterans on July 25—but this also failed to materialize.
Nine members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee
showed their faces together on July 27, indicating that the Beidaihe meeting had been adjourned.

On July 30, Hong Kong’s Apple Daily commented,

“Leaders from the high level are still fighting about
the military senior personnel arrangements.

Heng He, current affairs commentator, says, after the 7/21
Beijing floods all CCP Standing Committee members had disappeared from the media headlines for 16 days.
Indicating intense fighting within the high level CCP
towards the next generation of candidates.

Heng He: “It is the end of July, according to traditions,
military ranks should be granted once.
However, this year the CCP faces more important issues
than endowing military ranks.
When the problem of the next successors is not resolved,
the CCP cannot take care of the matter of endowments.”

Wu Fan, chief editor of China Affairs says, in the army there is
fighting between the ‘pro-Bo’ and ‘against-Bo’ factions.
Hu Jintao does not have sufficient influence in the military,
so there are more major problems than endowing generals.

[Wu Fan, chief editor of China Affairs]: “Granting the rank is not the main issue for now;
who gets into the Central Military Commission is crucial.
The new Central Military Commissioners are not there yet
and this is disadvantageous for Hu Jintao.
Hu wants to be chairman of the
Central Military Commission (CMC);
in the first two years, Hu must form an alliance
the vice chairman and all new members of the CMC.”

After Bo Xilai’s downfall, China’s military has often
expressed loyalty to Hu Jintao—Wu Fan thinks there may be implicit deals in the making.

[Wu Fan]: “Previously, Guo Boxiong had led all members of
the CMC and the Vice Chairman to pledge allegiance,
however, I think it is only on the surface.

They are negotiating with Hu Jintao—I’ll be loyal to you,
and you can be the chairman of the CMC for two years.
In return, as members of the CMC, we will have the right to
speak—I believe there is a compromise there."

The CCP has not announced charges against Bo Xilai;
recently, Chongqing Garrison Commander Zhu Heping,
who was implicated in Bo Xilai’s case, reappeared in public
after having disappeared for three months.
Hong Kong’s Ming Pao Daily quoted an analyst’s comment,

“the CCP has tried to narrow the influence of Bo Xilai’s case,
in particular, not to let it affect the military’s stability.”

Heng He believes that the CCP wants to reduce
the influence of the Bo Xilai incident,
and therefore, it is giving up further studying
the officials’ renewed loyalty.

[Heng He]: “The highest CCP authorities want to ‘damage
the control’ of Bo Xilai case, meaning to reduce its influence.
They do not want military unrest to occur;
since they do not have the ability to bring out military unrest,
they must rely on the power within
the army to settle the rest."

Fan Wu points out that this once again demonstrates
that the military and the CCP are not of one mind.

[Wu Fan]: “Bo’s downfall has not hurt the police commander,
because someone from above has protected him.
They are negotiating—you can be the chairman of the CMC,
but you must not intervene with things in the military.
Superficially I am loyal to you, but that is an empty promise;
we can make a deal, but truly following you will be very hard.”

Zhu Heping was fired for using public funds from Bo Xilai
to construct a building for retired military officers.
In addition, other commanders being implicated in the case
such as General Liu Yuan, General Zhang Haiyang
and Major General Zhou Xiao Zhou, have all re-appeared
in public, one after another.
Zhou Xiao Zhou was recently promoted to chief of staff
of the Chengdu Military Region.

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